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This paper investigates whether there is a connection between psychopathy and
certain manifestations of social and economic behavior, measured in a lab-in-the-
field experiment with prison inmates. In order to test this main hypothesis, we let
inmates play four games that have often been used to measure prosocial and
antisocial behavior in previous experimental economics literature. Specifically, they play
a prisoner’s dilemma, a trust game, the equality equivalence test that elicits distributional
preferences, and a corruption game. Psychopathy is measured by means of the
Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP) questionnaire, which inmates filled
out after having made their decisions in the four games. We find that higher scores
in the LSRP are significantly correlated with anti-social behavior in the form of weaker
reciprocity, lower cooperation, lower benevolence and more bribe-oriented decisions
in the corruption game. In particular, not cooperating and bribe-maximizing decisions
are associated with significantly higher LSRP primary and LSRP secondary scores. Not
reciprocating is associated with higher LSRP primary and being spiteful with higher LSRP
secondary scores.
Keywords: psychopathy, pro-social behavior, prison inmates, lab-in-the-field, experiment
INTRODUCTION
The World Prison Population List1 gives its readers information on the number of prisoners
held in the territories of 222 countries worldwide. Although comparability of imprisonment rates
across countries must be subject to caution, data show that the overall prison population has been
increasing in the last four decades. The United States of America currently hold over 2.3 million
people in prison (Sawyer and Wagner, 2020), which represents the highest prison population rate
in the world. The costs for correctional spending and crime combat are the fastest growing budget
item after Medicaid (Henrichson and Delaney, 2012). Calculating the costs of criminal activity is
quite difficult, since they vary widely among various offense categories. For instance, estimates place
the total cost of crime in England and Wales at £60 billion in the year 2000 (Brand and Price,
2020). The vast amount of costs generated by criminal incidents and the attempt to administrate its
consequences make it necessary to better understand the underlying nature of criminal behavior.
1http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/world_prison_population_list_11th_edition_0.pdf
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Anti-social and criminal behavior can partly be explained by
various personality disorders. One of them is psychopathy, a
personality disorder defined by a lack of empathy for others.
This disorder is related to antisocial disposition and characterized
by having impaired empathy or lack of remorse, egotistical
personality traits and sometimes even expressing cold blooded
behavior toward others. Brandt et al. (1997) estimate that the
base rate of psychopathy among prison population is as high
as 37%. This high prevalence of psychopathic traits means that
examining the relationship between such traits and behavior
among criminals is of particular value.
The objective of this study is to investigate whether there is
a connection between psychopathy and certain manifestations
of social and economic behavior, measured in a lab-in-the-
field experiment with inmates. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study connecting psychopathic traits with social
and economic behavior in a prison environment. Hence, our
main research question is: Can psychopathic traits explain social
and economic behavior among inmates? Many dilemmas in
economic situations involve a conflict between selfish monetary
reward maximization and devotion to ethical, pro-social norms
connected to inferior economic benefit. The existence of ethical
behavioral patterns among institutionalized subjects is of great
interest as the starting point of rehabilitation and social inclusion
strategies based on the principle that everyone is ethical to
some extent.
To answer our research question, we use four games that
have often been used to measure prosocial and antisocial
behavior in the experimental economics literature: a prisoner’s
dilemma (henceforth PD), a trust game (henceforth TG), the
equality equivalence test that elicits distributional preferences
(henceforth EET), and a corruption game (henceforth CG). This
choice of games is motivated by the fact that trust, reciprocity,
cooperativeness, and distributional preferences are behavioral
traits of essential importance for a successful rehabilitation of
inmates into social and professional life after their release from
prison (see Balafoutas et al., 2020, for a discussion). In addition,
our study is the first to collect data on inmates’ actions in a game
meant to capture essential aspects of a corruption setting. Data
from the corruption game allow us to study inmates’ decisions
when facing a social dilemma that includes an ethical component.
We correlate behavior in all these games to a measure of
psychopathy based on the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy
Scale (henceforth LSRP).
The data collection took place as part of a lab-in-the-field
experiment conducted with 176 inmates in two prisons in
Chania, Greece. Inmates played the games described above, in
a number of sessions conducted within prison and following
standard experimental protocol (regarding randomization,
anonymity, and the use of monetary incentives). It is important
to note that not all inmates played the four games. Out of the 176
inmates, 71 were recruited in the 2015 sessions and decided only
on the CG, and 105 were recruited in 2016–2017 and decided on
the TG, PD, and EET. The behavioral data from the economic
games are complemented by administrative and survey data,
including the LSRP.
Our results reveal that psychopathy as measured in the
LSRP explains several aspects of inmates’ social behavior. Higher
scores in the LSRP are significantly correlated with anti-social
behavior in the form of weaker reciprocity, lower cooperation,
lower benevolence (implying a higher likelihood that a person is
classified as having spiteful distributional preferences), and more
bribe-oriented decisions in the corruption game.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Economic Experiments in Prisons
Despite the large economic and social costs of crime and
the importance attributed by society and policymakers on the
rehabilitation of criminal offenders, there is a relative scarcity of
economic research on the behavior of prison inmates. Recently,
a few studies using experimental economic methods have
successfully overcome the practical and administrative challenges
linked to this kind of research, yielding valuable insights on
several aspects of the social and economic behavior of prison
populations. One lesson that can be drawn from this literature
is that differences in pro-social behavior (mainly altruism and
cooperativeness) between prison inmates and samples of non-
criminals are not systematic or consistent. Some studies find
either very small, or negligible differences (Birkeland et al., 2014;
Chmura et al., 2016), while others suggest that prison inmates
are less pro-social than other groups of participants (Clark et al.,
2015), or even more pro-social in some cases (Khadjavi and
Lange, 2013; Nese et al., 2016).
Besides documenting patterns of behavior among inmates and
comparing them to different samples, a few recent studies in
prisons have considered topics such as the deterrence effect of
punishment on antisocial behavior (Khadjavi, 2015), criminal
identity and ethical behavior (Cohn et al., 2015), and the existence
of in-group bias within a stigmatized group such as prison
inmates (Balafoutas et al., 2020). Guo et al. (2020) differentiate
between inmates’ behavior toward an in-prison and out-of-prison
sample and show that a simple priming intervention can promote
rehabilitation by strengthening inmates’ pro-social behavior
toward the out-group. The current study uses, in part, the same
sample as Balafoutas et al. (2020), but it studies an entirely
different and hitherto unanswered question on the relationship
between psychopathy and behavior among prisoners.
Psychopathy and Economic Behavior
Cleckley (1956) defines psychopathy as being manipulative,
egocentric, impulsive, deceitful, and exhibiting antisocial
behavior. The partial overlap between this definition and
the purely self-interest notion of homo oeconomicus initiated
a series of studies investigating whether psychopathy or
psychopathic personality traits are linked to entrepreneurial
abilities and success. Babiak et al. (2010) estimated that the
general psychopathy prevalence is three times higher among the
business workforce compared to the general population. Akhtar
et al. (2013) argued that a certain degree of manipulativeness and
callousness, both psychopathic characteristics, can be necessary
for high achievements in a respective business field. Walters
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(2004) remarks that the primary psychopathic personality traits
such as “superficial charm, deceit, lack of guilt read like the
job description of a good car salesman or a politician” (page
144). Akhtar et al. (2013) report moderate correlation between
entrepreneurial activities and psychopathy but provide only
weak support for the stereotype of a “corporate psychopath.”
They find that primary psychopathy is negatively correlated
to “social entrepreneurship,” i.e., initiate social activities such
as improving the community, enhance education, or create
student organizations. Similar conclusions have been obtained
by Hassall et al. (2015) who measure academic success and
psychopathic personality traits among business and psychology
students and find that business students score significantly
higher on psychopathy scores—albeit without a significant
effect on academic success. One lesson that emerges from this
strand of the literature is that we need to better understand
psychopathic traits.
The literature in experimental economics that relates
psychopathy to behavior in economic games is rather scarce,
and at the same time highly relevant for our work. In a lab
experiment, Ibáñez et al. (2016) study the relationship between
emotions and trust. As a sign of the manipulative stage of
a psychopath’s behavior, they find that higher psychopathy
scores are correlated with non-reciprocal decisions. A similar
branch of the literature has examined the relationship between
psychopathy and cooperative behavior in economic games.
Mokros et al. (2008) find that psychopaths in a high-security
psychiatric hospital behave in a non-cooperative manner in
a prisoner’s dilemma. Montañes et al. (2003) use various
modifications of the prisoner’s dilemma and show that Antisocial
Personality Disorder correlates with non-cooperative behavior.
Rilling et al. (2007) use a sample of 30 non-clinical subjects whose
psychopathy is assessed using LSRP scores and Psychopathic
Personality Inventory (PPI). In the repeated version of the
prisoner’s dilemma, they find a high correlation between non-
cooperative behavior and higher LSRP scores among the male
participants of their sample. On the contrary, they find no
effect of psychopathy measured by the PPI. Curry et al. (2011)
report that individuals with higher scores in the Machiavellian
Egocentricity subscale of the PPI are less likely to behave
cooperatively. Hence, considering cooperative behavior as a
metric of empathy and a pro-social inclination, research so
far indicates that psychopathy relates negatively to cooperation
in social dilemma situations2,3. Our paper contributes to this
branch of the literature by being the first to examine the
relationship between psychopathy and various measures of
prosocial behavior in a sample of imprisoned subjects with a
verified criminal record.
Psychopathy and Criminal Behavior
The definition of psychopathy by Cleckley (1956) suggests that
a number of negatively perceived personality traits should be
2However, pro-social behavior may also relate to selfish inter-temporal
cooperation (collusion), or even a subject’s risk attitudes. See for instance Sabater-
Grande and Georgantzis (2002).
3Gillespie et al. (2013) and Spitzer et al. (2007) consider the connection between
psychopathy and ultimatum games.
considered core characteristics of psychopaths. On the other
hand, observing antisocial behavior clearly is not sufficient to
categorize someone as a psychopath. Most prison inmates, for
instance, would be considered as antisocial to a certain degree,
while only a minority of them expresses psychopathic personality
disorders (Levenson et al., 1995). Nevertheless, antisocial
behavior, impulsivity, lack of remorse, and the proneness toward
violence is often seen as an explanation for why psychopaths tend
to show more aggressive behavior among the institutionalized
population. Vaughn et al. (2009) examine the potential subtypes
of psychopathy among incarcerated juveniles and find that
offenders scoring high in psychopathic measures indicate a
greater likelihood of participating in self and other-destructive
behavior than non-psychopathic juveniles. Compared to other
criminals, psychopaths commit a significantly higher number
of crimes and more violent ones (Hare and McPherson, 1984).
Although some researchers have opposed these findings and
conceded psychopathy only a limited role in crime forecasting,
they nevertheless acknowledge the need for further research into
psychopathic personality traits and the behavior of criminals
(Walters, 2004).
Forecasting the likelihood of criminal acts would be without
doubt a useful tool for police resource allocation and a potential
way to reduce costs caused by the imprisoned population.
Hence, improving crime prediction using models based on
regularity and space clusters combined with psychological risk
assessments that predict antisocial behavior should be considered
(Brinkley et al., 2008; Johnson, 2010). Models developed for
crime forecasts presently concentrate on social status, locality
and crime opportunity, but individual characteristics are growing
in importance, especially since crimes committed in affect are
hard to account for (Miller et al., 2008; Johnson, 2010). Current
research appears to regard psychopathy as a promising indicator
for violence even among the female population (Levenson et al.,
1995)4.
It is worth noting that Miller et al. (2008) and other
researchers (Porter et al., 2001; Skeem et al., 2007) assume
that primary psychopaths are born with such a predisposition,
whereas secondary psychopaths are believed to be shaped by
their environment. The first to introduce such a distinction
was Karpman (1948) who proposed a re-orientation of the
concept of psychopathic personality. Specifically, he suggested
to divide it into two main groups: the symptomatic or
secondary psychopathy, and the primary, essential, or idiopathic
psychopathy. Under the heading of secondary psychopathy are
included the psychoses and neuroses that have a strong antisocial
or delinquent aspect. Individuals of the other, primary group,
suffer from a disease of its own designated as anethopathy. This
is a mental disease, characterized by a personality organization
having in particular a virtual absence of any redeeming social
reaction (conscience, guilt, binding and generous emotions,
etc.), while purely egoistic, uninhibited instinctive trends are
4Regarding the role of gender, we note the existence of strong evidence that
psychopathic personality traits as egocentrism, manipulativeness, etc. manifest
quite differently among the genders (Brinkley et al., 2008; Croson and Gneezy,
2009).
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predominant. These are as close to the constitutional as can be
found. Despite the clarity of past literature, there are still many
empirical studies that investigate the frontier between primary
and secondary psychopathy5. Further research will shape the
view of psychopathy as either being an inborn or a molded
personality disorder.
Measuring Psychopathy
There exists a diverse selection of measurement tools to assess
psychopathy. Two popular ones are the Hare Psychopathy
Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) also sometimes called Psychopathy
Checklist—revised (Hare and Neumann, 2006) and the Levenson
Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (Levenson et al., 1995). The
PCL-R is constructed as a semi-structured interview and
additionally uses official records (Hare and Neumann, 2006). It is
capable of addressing both primary and secondary, psychopathic
subgroups (Hare and Neumann, 2006). From a cost effectiveness
perspective, the PCL-R has some notable disadvantages. For
example, it is necessary that a trained clinical expert executes the
interview, which is relatively time consuming (Lynam et al., 1999;
Brinkley et al., 2001). Moreover, its development is primarily
based on male offenders and requires historical records (Lynam
et al., 1999; Brinkley et al., 2001).
Based on Karpman’s (1948) initial distinction, Levenson
et al. (1995) studied antisocial dispositions among non-
institutionalized populations and developed the well-known
Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy scale (LSRP). The LSRP is
a self-report measure which was designed to assess primary
and secondary psychopathic features in non-institutionalized
populations. It is an advantage that it does not require
historical crime records. Lynam et al. (1999) regard, based
on their findings, the LSRP-Scale as a reasonable measure
for psychopathy in context of variant measurements. Miller
et al. (2008) conclude that the LSRP is significantly related to
personality traits commonly seen in psychopathic individuals
such as agreeableness and narcissistic behavior. Furthermore, the
LSRP is strongly correlated with negative emotionality and other
personality disorder symptoms.
Hence, both self-report tests (PCL-R as the LSRP) are capable
of measuring psychopathic tendencies reliably to various degrees
(Zolondek et al., 2006; Brinkley et al., 2008; Miller et al., 2008;
Becker et al., 2012). Given that the LSRP is less time consuming
and does not require historical crime records, we selected it for
the present study.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our experimental design is based on four simple economic
games6 and the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy (LSRP)
5For instance, Vaughn et al. (2009) demonstrate that young offenders who have
been identified with strong expressions of the secondary subtype were more
likely to have experienced trauma and abuses in their past, thus supporting
the assumption that secondary psychopathy is possibly caused by environmental
factors.
6Sessions were conducted in different years and although the LSRP test was filled
in all sessions, not all four games were applied for all the sample. See subsection 3.3
for details on this aspect of our experimental procedures.
TABLE 1 | The prisoner’s dilemma.
Player 2
Defect Cooperate
Player 1 Defect 3, 3 9, 1
Cooperate 1, 9 7, 7
scale, supplemented by a collection of socio-demographic data,
questions related to inmates’ experience inside the prison and
data provided by the prison administration.
The Games
Trust Game
We use a discrete version of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995).
Subjects are matched in groups of two and are randomly assigned
one of two roles in a between-subjects design: player 1 (sender),
or player 2 (receiver). The sender has two strategies, to trust or
not to trust the receiver. If he does not trust, both players earn
an outside option of e10 each. If he trusts, the total available
surplus is doubled (e40) and the receiver is then asked to take
one of two actions: she can either reciprocate the sender’s trust
by implementing an equal split of e20 for each player, or choose
the non-reciprocal action and keep e35 for herself, leaving the
sender with only e57. While trust and reciprocity lead to an
improvement and a doubling of payoffs for both players, the
subgame perfect equilibrium prediction for this game is that
receivers never reciprocate trust, and anticipating this, senders
never trust8.
Prisoner’s Dilemma
We use the same version of the simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma
as Balafoutas et al. (2020) and Khadjavi and Lange (2013),
depicted in Table 1. Two players simultaneously decide either
to cooperate with the other player or to defect. The dominant
strategy for both players—and hence the Nash equilibrium—is
defection, while choosing to cooperate is the pro-social action
that leads to a Pareto improvement in payoffs if it is chosen by
both players.
Equality Equivalence Test
In contrast to all other games, the Equality Equivalence Test
(Kerschbamer, 2015) entails no strategic interaction. This test
elicits distributional preference types by asking each subject
to make ten binary choices between an equal and an unequal
allocation, involving an own payoff and a payoff for a randomly
matched subject. The ten choices are shown in Table 2,
7We implemented the strategy method for collecting data on receivers’ choices,
which means that they were asked to make a choice between the two possible
allocations for the event that the sender they were matched with decided to trust
them.
8It should be noticed that pro-social choices by senders and receivers in the
trust game can arise from several motivations, the identification of which is
beyond the scope of this work (Cox, 2004; Isoni and Sugden, 2019). The literature
commonly refers to such choices as trust (in the case of senders) and reciprocity or
trustworthiness (in the case of receivers).
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TABLE 2 | The equality equivalence test (EET).
Left Right
You Another You Another
person gets person gets
Disadvantageous Inequality Block
3.2 5.2 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
3.6 5.2 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
4 5.2 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
4.4 5.2 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
4.8 5.2 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
Advantageous inequality block
3.2 2.8 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
3.6 2.8 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
4 2.8 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
4.4 2.8 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
4.8 2.8 LEFT RIGHT 4 4
broken down into a disadvantageous inequality block and an
advantageous inequality block, referring to the direction of
inequality as seen from the perspective of the decision maker.
The ten choices, and in particular the row at which the subject
switches from the equal to the unequal allocation, allow us to
classify all subjects into one of four basic distributional preference
types: altruistic (or efficiency loving), inequality averse, spiteful,
and inequality loving9.
CG
The Corruption Game (CG) framework studied here is based on
Jaber-López et al. (2014). In a framed interaction protocol, two
subjects in the role of “firms” bid in quality (Q) and bribe (B)
levels (both in integers ranging between 0 and 10, Q + B = 10),
for the procurement of a “public project,” the quality of which is
beneficial to all players within a group and individually profitable
to the winning firm. A third subject in the role of a “public
official” chooses the winning proposal having full information on













Assuming rational and selfish subjects, there are three pure
strategy Nash equilibria for firms’ behavior with a discrete
strategy space in this game: (Q, B)= (7, 3), (Q, B)= (6, 4), and (Q,
B)= (5, 5). Rational and selfish public officials maximize earnings
therefore the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium predicts that
they will choose the firm that offers the highest bribe. This
9For more details on the classification of types, see Kerschbamer (2015). Note that
selfish subjects are a subset of the four other categories and that including them as
a separate category does not affect any of our findings.
framework represents a social dilemma, in the form of a tradeoff
between quality and bribes. For firms, higher bribe payments
indicate lower pro-sociality, since they imply sacrificing social
welfare in the interest of increasing one’s likelihood of winning
the prize. For public officials, bribe-maximizing (as opposed to
quality-maximizing) choices capture selfish, anti-social behavior,
while officials driven by pro-social motives may sacrifice part of
their own monetary earnings in favor of a higher quality project.
Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale
and Questionnaires
As already mention in section Measuring psychopathy, the
evaluation of psychopathy in our paper is based on the LSRP
(Levenson et al., 1995). Respondents state their degree of
agreement with each of 26 statements, on a Likert-scale ranging
from 1 (“totally disagree”) to 4 (“totally agree”)10. One attractive
feature of this scale is that it elicits the level of psychopathic
elements in a respondent’s personality by offering three types
of information, namely an aggregate measure of psychopathy
(comprising all 26 questions) and two specific ones: primary,
which refers to selfishness, lack of caring, manipulation of others
and callous attitudes and is based on the first 16 questions; and
the secondary psychopathy scale, associated with an impulsive,
volatile or self-destructive personal style and is based on the last
10 questions (see Levenson et al., 1995; Lynam et al., 1999). All
questions are shown in Supplementary Material 3.
Psychopathy by definition comprises manipulative and
abusive behavior. In particular, individuals who display
psychopathic traits are considered to be able to manipulate
others in order to achieve personal benefits, without guilt or
unfairness entering their moral considerations. Therefore, in our
experiment, we expect higher scores on the psychopathy scale to
be associated with less cooperative and pro-social behavior.
Inmates were asked to fill out the LSRP questionnaire after
having made their decisions in the four games (TG, PD, EET,
and CG). They were also asked to provide socio-demographic
information (on their nationality, age, marital status, education
level, and number of siblings). Additionally, we asked them
to answer some questions regarding the conditions of their
imprisonment: time spent in the current prison, number of times
imprisoned, total time spent in prison during their life, type and
length of sentence, attendance of religious activities in prison,
number of cell mates, frequency of leaving the prison (for any
reason) and number of working days per month. The prison
administration provided us with this same information, allowing
us to double check and correct for minor discrepancies.
Procedures
In January 2015 we ran one session in the low security
agricultural prison facility of “Agia” and one session in the high
security prison facility “Crete 1,” in which subjects played only
the CG. In November 2016 we ran one session in the high
security prison and two simultaneous sessions in the low security
agricultural prison, in which subjects played the PD, TG, and
10The Likert-scale items are phrased so as to minimize indication of disapproval
for item endorsement.
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EET. In April 2017 we conducted an additional session in the
low security prison and again subjects played PD, TG, and EET.
In all sessions, subjects also filled out the LSRP questionnaire.
We recruited volunteer male inmates by posting announcements
around the prison premises. Additionally, 2 days before each
session, the experimenters went to the prison to answer possible
questions and give a short explanation of what is an economic
experiment. Once they decided to participate, inmates had to
register through the prison administration.
All sessions took place either in the prison’s gym or in
the library. No guards were present and we insisted on and
guaranteed subjects’ anonymity, by giving them a random
number so there was no way to associate a decision with a
name.We were very cautious inminimizing any kind of audience
effects. The experiment was conducted with pencil and paper.
Subjects could choose among four different languages for their
booklet of instructions: Greek, English, Arabic or French11.
We enforced the usual experimental practice of not allowing
for communication among subjects and ensuring anonymity in
decision making. Once the session was ready to start, one of
the experimenters explained aloud the general instructions of the
experiment and answered possible questions. Subjects were told
that one game would be chosen randomly by the social worker
at the end of the session. Given that inmates are not allowed to
receive money directly, we explained to them that their payment
would be credited to their personal prison account, which can be
used to buy goods inside the prison.
Afterwards, the experiment started and participants were
asked to keep silent until the end of the session. In the sessions
conducted in 2016 and 2017, we randomized the order in which
the PD and TG were presented and played, although we kept the
EET always as the third game. The instructions for each game
were read in silent by each subject and they could go through
the booklet at their own pace. Three experimenters were present
in each session in order to answer any question in private and
to assist participants. After making all decisions and filling out
the questionnaires, participants left the session and received their
payment one day later12.
Our sample consists of 176 inmates in total. The mean age
of inmates is 36.40 years old, they have 4.21 siblings and 1.09
children on average, and 52% of them are married. The mean
sentence is 20.06 years and the remaining sentence is 10.46
years on average13. Out of the 176 inmates, 71 were recruited
in the 2015 sessions and decided only on the CG, and 105 were
recruited in 2016–2017 and decided on the TG, PD, and EET.
The data collected in 2016 and 2017 (N = 105) are also used in
11Instructions in languages other than English were translated from
English by native speakers. The experimental instructions can be found in
Supplementary Material 2.
12We note that there was no attrition during a session: all participants completed
all parts of the experiment and none left a session before doing so. However, some
participants did not fill out all information in the questionnaires, including a few
who did not answer all questions in the LSRP, leading to a smaller effective sample
size used in the data analysis.
13For more information on the sociodemographic characteristics of the inmates
recruited during the sessions in 2016 and 2017 please refer to Balafoutas et al.
(2020).
Balafoutas et al. (2020), which we already referred to in section
Literature review. For this reason, it is important to clarify the
commonalities and differences between the two studies. Two key
features in Balafoutas et al. (2020) were the administration of a
priming intervention for part of the sample in a between-subjects
design, as well as the distinction between an in-group and an out-
group: inmates played each of the three games (TG, PD, EET)
once with another inmate (in-group) and once with someone
from outside prison (out-group), in a within-subjects design. The
priming intervention consisted of a piece of text that inmates
were asked to write, reflecting on the time they had spent in
prison and on how it had affected their behavior (see Balafoutas
et al., 2020, for more details).
In the present study, we pool the data from the priming
and the control condition, since one can reasonably expect
this intervention to be orthogonal to the relationship between
psychopathy and economic behavior, which is the research
question here14. Regarding the distinction between an in-group
and an out-group, in this study we only use data on decisions
affecting an inmate’s in-group (i.e., other inmates). This is due to
two reasons: first, in the 2015 sessions all inmates interact with
their in-group only, and therefore we do not have out-group data
for the corruption game. Second, our interest in this study lies in
the nature of the relationship between psychopathy and behavior,
without the additional dimension of group favoritism or bias.
RESULTS
We begin this section by presenting (in Table 3) summary
statistics for behavior in the four games played by the inmates
in our sample. The table reveals strong statistical variation
in behavior across participating inmates, thus facilitating the
examination of a relationship between behavior and elicited
psychopathic traits. Rates of trusting in the TG (Trust),
cooperating in the PD (Cooperation) and taking the bribe-
maximizing decision in the CG (Bribe max) are all within a
3- to 6 percentage point distance from 50%, while reciprocal
choices (Reciprocity) are rather frequent at about two-thirds of
all choices. In line with most existing studies in experimental
economics, behavior in these games is not in line with the Nash
equilibrium for selfish subjects. Trust is observed in almost half
of the cases, and it is rewarded by second movers in a majority of
interactions. Similarly, cooperation rates in the PD lie (at 55%)
between the Nash equilibrium of 0% and the social optimum
of 100%. In the CG, mean bribes (of 1.75) are between the
social optimum of 0 and any of the three pure strategy Nash
equilibria, while officials choose the quality-maximizing instead
of the bribe-maximizing in just over half of the cases. All of these
points toward a considerable degree of pro-social orientation
14This orthogonality assumption is something that we can test: for all regressions
presented in the results section (see in particular Supplementary Tables 1–9 in the
Supplementary Material), we have estimated versions in which we add a dummy
variable equal to 1 for all inmates in the priming group, as well as interactions
between this variable and the LSRP scores. All these terms are insignificant,
supporting the validity of pooling the data from the two groups in the analysis.
These regressions are not shown in the paper in the interest of brevity but they are
available upon request.
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TABLE 3 | Summary statistics.
% / Mean N St. Dv.
TG
Trust 44.97% 59 0.50
Reciprocity 65.22% 46 0.48
PD
Cooperation 55.24% 105 0.49
CG
Bribe 1.75 48 1.63
Bribe max 47.83% 23 0.51
EET
Spiteful 20% 21/105 0.40
Inequality averse 13.33% 14/105 0.34
Inequality loving 34.28% 36/105 0.48
Altruistic 32.38% 34/105 0.47
LSRP
Primary 27.40 153 12.32
Secondary 17.50 158 7.57
Total 44.58 151 18.65
among inmates. Finally, each of the four distributional preference
types (Spiteful, Inequality Averse, Inequality Loving, Altruistic)
accounts for at least 13% and at most 34% of the sample
(the exact number of subjects in each type is also shown
in Table 3).
Turning to an examination of our main research question
regarding the relationship between psychopathy and behavior,
Table 4 reports mean values of psychopathy as measured in
the LSRP, differentiating between primary, secondary, and total
psychopathy and linking it to behavior in each of the four
games15. In particular, LSRP scores are compared across two
sub-groups (yes vs. no) of subjects in each game. For each
comparison, the table reports p-values from two-tailed t-tests.
The first two rows in Table 4 relate psychopathy to behavior
in the trust game. Neither primary nor secondary psychopathy
differs significantly between inmates who displayed trusting
behavior in this game. Reciprocity, on the other hand, is
significantly linked to the LSRP scale: inmates who do not
reciprocate trust score higher on primary (and, as a result,
on total) psychopathy than those who reciprocate. Similarly,
the third row of the table reveals that inmates who take
the antisocial action in the prisoner’s dilemma (i.e., those
who do not cooperate) score significantly higher on both
dimensions of psychopathy (primary and secondary) than those
who cooperate.
The EET allows us to classify each experimental participant
into one of four types of revealed distributional preferences.
On aggregate, we find that secondary psychopathy and total
psychopathy differ significantly across the four distributional
15We perform a Cronbach’s alpha test with LSRP primary, secondary and total
leading to a scale reliability coefficient of 0.87.
preference types (p = 0.03 and p = 0.05, respectively; Kruskal-
Wallis tests), while the same is not true for primary psychopathy
(p = 0.16). Turning to each of the four types in isolation, most
differences are insignificant. One observation that stands out,
however, is that inmates classified as having spiteful preferences
have a significantly higher level of LSRP secondary and LSRP
total than the other types combined (see row “Spiteful” in
Table 4).
In the corruption game, as in the trust game, the sample is
split between inmates deciding in the role of “public officials”
and inmates deciding in the role of “firms.” We thus report
two behavioral outcomes for this game. The main finding with
respect to psychopathy is that public officials who take bribe
maximizing decisions—i.e., those who behave antisocially by
reducing total welfare—have a significantly higher level of LSRP
primary, LSRP secondary and total than those who take quality-
maximizing decisions. With respect to the decisions of firms,
we split our sample of inmates between those who offer a
bribe above vs. below the median and compare LSRP levels
across the two. We find no significant differences in any of the
LSRP dimensions.
Our results thus show that psychopathy, as elicited in the
LSRP, significantly correlates with several behavioral measures in
the sample of prison inmates who participated in our experiment.
Inmates who do not reciprocate, do not cooperate, who are
spiteful and who maximize bribe offers have higher levels of
psychopathy than their counterparts, ceteris paribus. For these
dimensions, a consistent pattern emerges: inmates with higher
scores on the psychopathy scales have a higher tendency toward
antisocial behavior16.
To confirm the robustness of these findings, in
Supplementary Material 1 we also report the results of
regressions analyses with trust (Supplementary Table 1),
reciprocity (Supplementary Table 2), bribe maximizing
decisions (Supplementary Table 3), bribe levels and
bribe maximizing behavior in the corruption game
(Supplementary Tables 4, 5), and belonging to each of the
four distributional preference types (Supplementary Tables 6–
9) as dependent variables. The main independent variables are
LSRP Primary, LSRP Secondary, and LSRP Total. In addition
to parsimonious specifications that include only psychopathy
scores, we estimate (in the Probit regressions for trust, reciprocity
and cooperation) specifications that control for a number of
inmate characteristics available to us through the prison
administration and elicited in the post-experimental surveys.
These controls are: time served in prison (time served) and total
sentence (total sentence), in months; a dummy variable (high
security) equal to one for all inmates in the high security prison;
the number of other inmates that someone shares a cell with
(cell share); education level (coded as 0: none; 1: elementary 2:
16Given the framing in the CG, an alternative interpretation of the antisocial
behavior of inmates is that it reflects their beliefs about the prison personnel that
they consider a public official. For instance, if they believe guards are corrupt, they
are more likely to engage in bribe-maximizing behavior to express how they believe
guards tend to act. In this case egocentric inmates may exhibit this antisocial
behavior to show their discomfort in their relationship with guards.
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TABLE 4 | Social behavior and psychopathy.
LSRP Primary LSRP Secondary Total








































































































p = 0.02** p = 0.01*** p = 0.01***













p = 0.35 p = 0.25 p = 0.76
All variables defined in text. p-values correspond to t-tests comparing the two binary categories created within each variable.
***, **, *indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.
secondary school; 3: high school; 4: university; 5: master); age,
a dummy variable equal to one for married inmates, number of
children, and number of siblings17.
The regression results confirm all main findings obtained
so far, both in the parsimonious and in the full specifications.
We document a significant relationship between primary
psychopathy and reciprocal behavior in the trust game,
between both dimensions of psychopathy and cooperation
in the prisoner’s dilemma, and between both dimensions of
psychopathy and bribe maximizing decisions by inmates in
the role of public officials in the corruption game. Regarding
distributional preference types, Supplementary Table 6 confirms
that higher levels of primary and secondary psychopathy are
more likely to be encountered among spiteful types (thereby
strengthening the non-parametric test results, which were
significant only for secondary psychopathy). In addition, the
regression analysis in Supplementary Table 7 points toward a
17In the corruption game these control variables are available only for a small sub-
sample of inmates, thus not yielding enough degrees of freedom to estimate the
full specifications.
further negative association between higher levels of (primary)
psychopathy and pro-social behavior, measured by the likelihood
of being classified as an inequality averse type.
DISCUSSION
Psychopathic personality traits are related to lack of empathy
and low inhibition, which would be expected to yield antisocial
behavior. In this paper, a population of subjects was recruited
among the inmates of two Greek prisons. They were asked to
reply to the questions of a self-reported psychopathy scale, the
LSRP. They were also faced with four incentivized decision-
making experimental tasks which are appropriate to study pro-
social (or antisocial) behavior. The four tasks involved decisions
affecting oneself and others and were chosen to represent
different types of interaction. First, a distributional task, the
EET, involved binary dictator-type choices among scenarios
regarding own and others’ rewards. Second, strategic interaction
was involved in a simultaneous (prisoner’s dilemma) game
involving strategic uncertainty on behalf of both players in
each subject pair. Third, in a sequential (trust) game, strategic
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uncertainty was limited to the first mover, while the second
player’s decision involved no strategic uncertainty. Finally, a
more complex, sequential three-player bribery game involved
both asymmetric roles and strategic uncertainty. In all these
contexts, psychopathy was found to predict antisocial behavior in
more or less the expected way, with the exception of active bribers
whose psychopathy scores did not predict their bribing behavior.
Specifically, higher psychopathy scores relate to lower levels of
reciprocity and cooperation, and a higher probability of passive
bribery, in the sense of making bribe-maximizing choices.
From a methodological point of view, the robustness of
our findings across different economic and game-theoretic
experimental tasks can be seen as a confirmation of the validity of
the methods used, including the task used for the measurement
of subjects’ psychopathy, LSRP. Furthermore, the association
of psychopathic traits with antisocial behavior is confirmed
in a relatively demanding design, in which a broadly used
psychometric instrument is shown to reasonably predict behavior
in a series of tasks that have the usual abstract framing of
context-free decision-making. This framing has interfered in
the way others are perceived as (un)trustworthy. Furthermore,
the economic decision- making contexts used here have shown
further ways of interpreting the difference between primary and
secondary psychopathy. The latter is a good predictor of the lack
of reciprocity toward people trusting the subject in the first place.
Therefore, the results reported here can be seen as an encouraging
sign of the benefits from interdisciplinary approaches in order to
address the important issue of external and internal validity of
the experimental paradigm in both economics and psychology
and ultimately document the existence of behavioral spillovers,
not only among different economic decision-making tasks, but
also across the borders of the two main behavioral sciences.
Regarding the limitations of our study, there are several
domains in which our experimental design could be improved
or at least complemented by new experiments. First of all, our
results come from male prisons. A natural extension would be to
check with female institutionalized subjects whether these results
are gender-specific. Similarly, a lot could be gained by studying
the behavior of inmates in other countries, in order to identify
possible prison-specific and country-specific effects. During the
experiments we often got the impression that the volunteering
inmates accepted to participate in our sessions out of curiosity
regarding our “true” objectives. They seemed to hold suspicions
regarding our independence from the prison authorities and the
anonymity of our protocols. In that sense, highly psychopathic
subjects may have adapted their responses in the LSRP test and
even their behavior in the experiments in order to project a
better self-image in the eyes of the researchers and, supposedly,
the prison authority. Future experiments in prison should try to
elicit subjects’ trust in the researchers’ independence and elicit
their beliefs on the intentions of the researchers when running
similar studies.
A general caveat of experiments with prisoners is that the
sample recruited among volunteering inmates will never be
comparable with a naturally occurring similar sample extracted
from the general population. The span of ages and nationalities
contrasts with the unique gender, and the clustering of education
on the lowest levels. Relatedly, a limitation of our study is that
it documents a relationship between psychopathic traits and
inmates’ behavior, but it cannot address the question whether
psychopathic individuals are more likely to enter prison, or
whether psychopathic trends develop inside prison. In general,
the extent to which the experience of incarceration shapes
behavior is an open and very interesting research question.
The small size of the sample is another issue which makes
it difficult for the researchers to consider sufficiently many
groups in terms of prisoner typologies in order to account for
the numerous individual factors which may underlie behavioral
differences. Finally, it is difficult -if not impossible- to find a
similar, naturally occurring, sample outside the prison to make
behavioral comparisons between the inmates and a baseline
with non-inmates.
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